| should it, therefore, be demanded, whether the sense of virtue be natural or artificial, I am of opinion, that it is impossible for me at present to give any precise answer to this question. |
| Perhaps it will appear afterwards, that our sense of some virtues is artificial, and that of others natural. |
| The discussion of this question will be more proper, when we enter upon an exact detail of each particular vice and virtue. |
| [Footnote 14. In the following discourse natural is also opposed sometimes to civil, sometimes to moral. |
| The opposition will always discover the sense, in which it is taken.] |
| Mean while it may not be amiss to observe from these definitions of natural and unnatural, that nothing can be more unphilosophical than those systems, which assert, that virtue is the same with what is natural, and vice with what is unnatural. |
| For in the first sense of the word, Nature, as opposed to miracles, both vice and virtue are equally natural; and in the second sense, as opposed to what is unusual, perhaps virtue will be found to be the most unnatural. |
| At least it must be owned, that heroic virtue, being as unusual, is as little natural as the most brutal barbarity. |
| As to the third sense of the word, it is certain, that both vice and virtue are equally artificial, and out of nature. |
| For however it may be disputed, whether the notion of a merit or demerit in certain actions be natural or artificial, it is evident, that the actions themselves are artificial, and are performed with a certain design and intention; otherwise they coued never be ranked under any of these denominations. |
| It is impossible, therefore, that the character of natural and unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the boundaries of vice and virtue. |
| Thus we are still brought back to our first position, that virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation. |
| This decision is very commodious; because it reduces us to this simple question, Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness, in order to shew the origin of its moral rectitude or depravity, without looking for any incomprehensible relations and qualities, which never did exist in nature, nor even in our imagination, by any clear and distinct conception. |
| I flatter myself I have executed a great part of my present design by a state of the question, which appears to me so free from ambiguity and obscurity. |
| PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE |
| SECT. I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
| I have already hinted, that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural; but that there are some virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind. |
| Of this kind I assert justice to be; and shall endeavour to defend this opinion by a short, and, I hope, convincing argument, before I examine the nature of the artifice, from which the sense of that virtue is derived. |
| It is evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. |
| The external performance has no merit. |
| We must look within to find the moral quality. |