| Moral good and evil are certainly distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason: But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particular persons. |
| My opinion is, that both these causes are intermixed in our judgments of morals; after the same manner as they are in our decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty: Though I am also of opinion, that reflections on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great lines of our duty. |
| There are, however, instances, in cases of less moment, wherein this immediate taste or sentiment produces our approbation. |
| Wit, and a certain easy and disengaged behaviour, are qualities immediately agreeable to others, and command their love and esteem. |
| Some of these qualities produce satisfaction in others by particular original principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for: Others may be resolved into principles, which are more general. |
| This will best appear upon a particular enquiry. |
| As some qualities acquire their merit from their being immediately agreeable to others, without any tendency to public interest; so some are denominated virtuous from their being immediately agreeable to the person himself, who possesses them. |
| Each of the passions and operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or disagreeable. |
| The first is virtuous, the second vicious. |
| This particular feeling constitutes the very nature of the passion; and therefore needs not be accounted for. |
| But however directly the distinction of vice and virtue may seem to flow from the immediate pleasure or uneasiness, which particular qualities cause to ourselves or others; it is easy to observe, that it has also a considerable dependence on the principle of sympathy so often insisted on. |
| We approve of a person, who is possessed of qualities immediately agreeable to those, with whom he has any commerce; though perhaps we ourselves never reaped any pleasure from them. |
| We also approve of one, who is possessed of qualities, that are immediately agreeable to himself; though they be of no service to any mortal. |
| To account for this we must have recourse to the foregoing principles. |
| Thus, to take a general review of the present hypothesis: Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which produces pain, is called vicious. |
| This pleasure and this pain may arise from four different sources. |
| For we reap a pleasure from the view of a character, which is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself. |
| One may, perhaps, be surprized. |
| that amidst all these interests and pleasures, we should forget our own, which touch us so nearly on every other occasion. |
| But we shall easily satisfy ourselves on this head, when we consider, that every particular person s pleasure and interest being different, it is impossible men coued ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them. |
| Now in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose character is examined; or that of persons, who have a connexion with him. |