| Epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former, Plato of the latter. |
| The distinction here signalized, subtle as it is, dates from the earliest times, and was long maintained. |
| The former asserted that reality resides in sensuous objects alone, and that everything else is merely imaginary; the latter, that the senses are the parents of illusion and that truth is to be found in the understanding alone. |
| The former did not deny to the conceptions of the understanding a certain kind of reality; but with them it was merely logical, with the others it was mystical. |
| The former admitted intellectual conceptions, but declared that sensuous objects alone possessed real existence. |
| The latter maintained that all real objects were intelligible, and believed that the pure understanding possessed a faculty of intuition apart from sense, which, in their opinion, served only to confuse the ideas of the understanding. |
| 2. In relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason, we find one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from experience, and another that they have their origin in reason alone. |
| Aristotle may be regarded as the bead of the empiricists, and Plato of the noologists. |
| Locke, the follower of Aristotle in modern times, and Leibnitz of Plato (although he cannot be said to have imitated him in his mysticism), have not been able to bring this question to a settled conclusion. |
| The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system, in which he always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of experience, was much more consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke. |
| The latter especially, after having derived all the conceptions and principles of the mind from experience, goes so far, in the employment of these conceptions and principles, as to maintain that we can prove the existence of God and the existence of God and the immortality of them objects lying beyond the soul--both of them of possible experience--with the same force of demonstration as any mathematical proposition. |
| 3. In relation to method. |
| Method is procedure according to principles. |
| We may divide the methods at present employed in the field of inquiry into the naturalistic and the scientific. |
| The naturalist of pure reason lays it down as his principle that common reason, without the aid of science--which he calls sound reason, or common sense--can give a more satisfactory answer to the most important questions of metaphysics than speculation is able to do. |
| He must maintain, therefore, that we can determine the content and circumference of the moon more certainly by the naked eye, than by the aid of mathematical reasoning. |
| But this system is mere misology reduced to principles; and, what is the most absurd thing in this doctrine, the neglect of all scientific means is paraded as a peculiar method of extending our cognition. |
| As regards those who are naturalists because they know no better, they are certainly not to be blamed. |
| They follow common sense, without parading their ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret, how we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of Democritus. |
| Quod sapio satis est mihi, non ego curo Esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones. PERSIUS -- Satirae, iii.78-79. is their motto, under which they may lead a pleasant and praiseworthy life, without troubling themselves with science or troubling science with them. |
| As regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method, they have now the choice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical, while they are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure. |