| The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employd to account for the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a subtility and refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of mere animals, but even of children and the common people in our own species; who are notwithstanding susceptible of the same emotions and affections as persons of the most accomplishd genius and understanding. |
| Such a subtility is a dear proof of the falshood, as the contrary simplicity of the truth, of any system. |
| Let us therefore put our present system concerning the nature of the understanding to this decisive trial, and see whether it will equally account for the reasonings of beasts as for these of the human species. |
| Here we must make a distinction betwixt those actions of animals, which are of a vulgar nature, and seem to be on a level with their common capacities, and those more extraordinary instances of sagacity, which they sometimes discover for their own preservation, and the propagation of their species. |
| A dog, that avoids fire and precipices, that shuns strangers, and caresses his master, affords us an instance of the first kind. |
| A bird, that chooses with such care and nicety the place and materials of her nest, and sits upon her eggs for a due time, and in suitable season, with all the precaution that a chymist is capable of in the most delicate projection, furnishes us with a lively instance of the second. |
| As to the former actions, I assert they proceed from a reasoning, that is not in itself different, nor founded on different principles, from that which appears in human nature. |
| It is necessary in the first place, that there be some impression immediately present to their memory or senses, in order to be the foundation of their judgment. |
| From the tone of voice the dog infers his masters anger, and foresees his own punishment. |
| From a certain sensation affecting his smell, he judges his game not to be far distant from him. |
| Secondly, The inference he draws from the present impression is built on experience, and on his observation of the conjunction of objects in past instances. |
| As you vary this experience, he varies his reasoning. |
| Make a beating follow upon one sign or motion for some time, and afterwards upon another; and he will successively draw different conclusions, according to his most recent experience. |
| Now let any philosopher make a trial, and endeavour to explain that act of the mind, which we call BELIEF, and give an account of the principles, from which it is derivd, independent of the influence of custom on the imagination. |
| and let his hypothesis be equally applicable to beasts as to the human species; and after he has done this, I promise to embrace his opinion. |
| But at the same time I demand as an equitable condition, that if my system be the only one, which can answer to all these terms, it may be receivd as entirely satisfactory and convincing. |
| And that it is the only one, is evident almost without any reasoning. |
| Beasts certainly never perceive any real connexion among objects. |
| It is therefore by experience they infer one from another. |
| They can never by any arguments form a general conclusion, that those objects, of which they have had no experience, resemble those of which they have. |
| It is therefore by means of custom alone, that experience operates upon them. |