| I have already hinted, that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural; but that there are some virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind. |
| Of this kind I assert justice to be; and shall endeavour to defend this opinion by a short, and, I hope, convincing argument, before I examine the nature of the artifice, from which the sense of that virtue is derived. |
| It is evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. |
| The external performance has no merit. |
| We must look within to find the moral quality. |
| This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. |
| But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produced them. |
| After the same manner, when we require any action, or blame a person for not performing it, we always suppose, that one in that situation should be influenced by the proper motive of that action, and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it. |
| If we find, upon enquiry, that the virtuous motive was still powerful over his breast, though checked in its operation by some circumstances unknown to us, we retract our blame, and have the same esteem for him, as if he had actually performed the action, which we require of him. |
| It appears, therefore, that all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives, and are considered merely as signs of those motives. |
| From this principle I conclude, that the first virtuous motive, which bestows a merit on any action, can never be a regard to the virtue of that action. |
| but must be some other natural motive or principle. |
| To suppose, that the mere regard to the virtue of the action. |
| may be the first motive, which produced the action, and rendered it virtuous, is to reason in a circle. |
| Before we can have such a regard, the action must be really virtuous; and this virtue must be derived from some virtuous motive: And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action. |
| A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous. |
| An action must be virtuous, before we can have a regard to its virtue. |
| Some virtuous motive, therefore, must be antecedent to that regard. |
| Nor is this merely a metaphysical subtilty; but enters into all our reasonings in common life, though perhaps we may not be able to place it in such distinct philosophical terms. |
| We blame a father for neglecting his child. |
| Why? because it shews a want of natural affection, which is the duty of every parent. |