| II. The second limitation is, that the agreeable or disagreeable object be not only closely related, but also peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons. |
| It is a quality observable in human nature, and which we shall endeavour to explain afterwards, that every thing, which is often presented. |
| and to which we have been long accustomed, loses its value in our eyes, and is in a little time despised and neglected. |
| We likewise judge of objects more from comparison than from their real and intrinsic merit; and where we cannot by some contrast enhance their value, we are apt to overlook even what is essentially good in them. |
| These qualities of the mind have an effect upon joy as well as pride; and it is remarkable, that goods. |
| which are common to all mankind, and have become familiar to us by custom, give us little satisfaction; though perhaps of a more excellent kind, than those on which, for their singularity, we set a much higher value. |
| But though this circumstance operates on both these passions, it has a much greater influence on vanity. |
| We are rejoiced for many goods, which, on account of their frequency, give us no pride. |
| Health, when it returns after a long absence, affords us a very sensible satisfaction; but is seldom regarded as a subject of vanity, because it is shared with such vast numbers. |
| The reason, why pride is so much more delicate in this particular than joy, I take to be, as follows. |
| In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate. viz, the cause or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passion. |
| But joy has only one object necessary to its production. viz, that which gives pleasure; and though it be requisite, that this bear some relation to self, yet that is only requisite in order to render it agreeable; nor is self, properly speaking, the object of this passion. |
| Since, therefore, pride has in a manner two objects, to which it directs our view; it follows, that where neither of them have any singularity, the passion must be more weakened upon that account, than a passion, which has only one object. |
| Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are every moment apt to do, we find we are not in the least distinguished; and upon comparing the object we possess, we discover still the same unlucky circumstance. |
| By two comparisons so disadvantageous the passion must be entirely destroyed. |
| III The third limitation is, that the pleasant or painful object be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also. |
| This circumstance, like the two foregoing, has an effect upon joy, as well as pride. |
| We fancy Ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others; but are still more ostentatious of our virtues than of our pleasures. |
| This proceeds from causes, which I shall endeavour to explain afterwards. |
| IV. The fourth limitation is derived from the inconstancy of the cause of these passions, and from the short duration of its connexion with ourselves. |
| What is casual and inconstant gives but little joy, and less pride. |