| If constant conjunction be implyed in what we call occasion, it is a real cause. |
| If not, it is no relation at all, and cannot give rise to any argument or reasoning. |
| Secondly, The same course of reasoning will make us conclude, that there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause, and that the common distinction betwixt moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature. |
| This clearly appears from the precedent explication of necessity. |
| It is the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind, which constitutes a physical necessity: And the removal of these is the same thing with chance. |
| As objects must either be conjoined or not, and as the mind must either be determined or not to pass from one object to another, it is impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity. |
| In weakening this conjunction and determination you do not change the nature of the necessity; since even in the operation of bodies, these have different degrees of constancy and force, without producing a different species of that relation. |
| The distinction, which we often make betwixt POWER and the EXERCISE of it, is equally without foundation. |
| Thirdly, We may now be able fully to overcome all that repugnance, which it is so natural for us to entertain against the foregoing reasoning, by which we endeavoured to prove, that the necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on any arguments either demonstrative or intuitive. |
| Such an opinion will not appear strange after the foregoing definitions. |
| If we define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the farmer are placed in a like relation of .priority and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter; we may easily conceive, that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence should be attended with such an object. |
| If we define a cause to be, AN OBJECT PRECEDENT AND CONTIGUOUS TO ANOTHER, AND SO UNITED WITH IT IN THE IMAGINATION, THAT THE IDEA OF THE ONE DETERMINES THE MIND TO FORM THE IDEA OF THE OTHER, AND THE IMPRESSION OF THE ONE TO FORM A MORE LIVELY IDEA OF THE OTHER; we shall make still less difficulty of assenting to this opinion. |
| Such an influence on the mind is in itself perfectly extraordinary and incomprehensible; nor can we be certain of its reality, but from experience and observation. |
| I shall add as a fourth corrollary that we can never have reason to believe that any object exists, of which we cannot form an idea. |
| For as all our reasonings concerning existence are derived from causation, and as all our reasonings concerning causation are derived from the experienced conjunction of objects, not from any reasoning or reflection, the same experience must give us a notion of these objects, and must remove all mystery from our conclusions. |
| This is so evident, that it would scarce have merited our attention, were it not to obviate certain objections of this kind, which might arise against the following reasonings concerning matter and substance. |
| I need not observe, that a full knowledge of the object is not requisite, but only of those qualities of it, which we believe to exist. |
| SECT. XV. RULES BY WHICH TO JUDGE OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS. |
| According to the precedent doctrine, there are no objects which by the mere survey, without consulting experience, we can determine to be the causes of any other; and no objects, which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be the causes. |
| Any thing may produce any thing. |
| Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other object we can imagine. |