| How much more must this be true with regard to the human mind, which being so confined a subject may justly be thought incapable of containing such a monstrous heap of principles, as wou d be necessary to excite the passions of pride and humility, were each distinct cause adapted to the passion by a distinct set of principles? |
| Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the time of COPERNICUS. |
| The antients, though sensible of that maxim, THAT NATURE DOES NOTHING IN VAIN, contrived such intricate systems of the heavens, as seemed inconsistent with true philosophy, and gave place at last to something more simple and natural. |
| To invent without scruple a new principle to every new phaenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain proofs, that none of these principles is the just one, and that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover our ignorance of the truth. |
| SECT. IV OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS |
| Thus we have established two truths without any obstacle or difficulty, that IT IS FROM NATURAL PRINCIPLES THIS VARIETY OF CAUSES EXCITES PRIDE AND HUMILITY, and that IT IS NOT BY A DIFFERENT PRINCIPLE EACH DIFFERENT CAUSE IS ADAPTED TO ITS PASSION. |
| We shall now proceed to enquire how we may reduce these principles to a lesser number, and find among the causes something common, on which their influence depends. |
| In order to this we must reflect on certain properties of human nature, which though they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers. |
| The first of these is the association of ideas, which I have so often observed and explained. |
| It is impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time; nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy. |
| But however changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. |
| The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produced by it. |
| When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction. |
| The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like association of impressions. |
| All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. |
| Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated. |
| In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other resembling affections. |
| It is difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation. |
| Human nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. |
| Changeableness is essential to it. |
| And to what can it so naturally change as to affections or emotions, which are suitable to the temper, and agree with that set of passions, which then prevail? It is evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas; though with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance. |