| Before I examine these arguments and objections in detail, I will here take them in a body, and endeavour by a short and decisive reason to prove at once, that it is utterly impossible they can have any just foundation. |
| It is an established maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. |
| We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. |
| We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible. |
| Now it is certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it? It is likewise certain that this idea, as conceived by the imagination, though divisible into parts or inferior ideas, is not infinitely divisible, nor consists of an infinite number of parts: For that exceeds the comprehension of our limited capacities. |
| Here then is an idea of extension, which consists of parts or inferior ideas, that are perfectly, indivisible: consequently this idea implies no contradiction: consequently it is possible for extension really to exist conformable to it: and consequently all the arguments employed against the possibility of mathematical points are mere scholastick quibbles, and unworthy of our attention. |
| These consequences we may carry one step farther, and conclude that all the pretended demonstrations for the infinite divisibility of extension are equally sophistical; since it is certain these demonstrations cannot be just without proving the impossibility of mathematical points; which it is an evident absurdity to pretend to. |
| SECT. III. OF THE OTHER QUALITIES OF OUR IDEA OF SPACE AND TIME. |
| No discovery coued have been made more happily for deciding all controversies concerning ideas, than that abovementioned, that impressions always take the precedency of them, and that every idea, with which the imagination is furnished, first makes its appearance in a correspondent impression. |
| These latter perceptions are all so clear and evident, that they admit of no controversy; though many of our ideas are so obscure, that it is almost impossible even for the mind, which forms them, to tell exactly their nature and composition. |
| Let us apply this principle, in order to discover farther the nature of our ideas of space and time. |
| Upon opening my eyes, and turning them to the surrounding objects, I perceive many visible bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering the distance betwixt these bodies, I acquire the idea of extension. |
| As every idea is derived from some impression, which is exactly similar to it, the impressions similar to this idea of extension, must either be some sensations derived from the sight, or some internal impressions arising from these sensations. |
| Our internal impressions are our passions, emotions, desires and aversions; none of which, I believe, will ever be asserted to be the model, from which the idea of space is derived. |
| There remains therefore nothing but the senses, which can convey to us this original impression. |
| Now what impression do oar senses here convey to us? This is the principal question, and decides without appeal concerning the nature of the idea. |
| The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. |
| This idea, then, is borrowed from, and represents some impression, which this moment appears to the senses. |
| But my senses convey to me only the impressions of coloured points, disposed in a, certain manner. |
| If the eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. |
| But if it be impossible to shew any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these coloured points, and of the manner of their appearance. |