| This might be true of things in themselves, but it cannot be asserted of phenomena, which, as conditions of each other, are only given in the empirical regress itself. |
| Hence, the question no longer is, "What is the quantity of this series of conditions in itself--is it finite or infinite?" for it is nothing in itself; but, "How is the empirical regress to be commenced, and how far ought we to proceed with it?" And here a signal distinction in the application of this rule becomes apparent. |
| If the whole is given empirically, it is possible to recede in the series of its internal conditions to infinity. |
| But if the whole is not given, and can only be given by and through the empirical regress, I can only say; "It is possible to infinity, to proceed to still higher conditions in the series." In the first case, I am justified in asserting that more members are empirically given in the object than I attain to in the regress (of decomposition). |
| In the second case, I am justified only in saying, that I can always proceed further in the regress, because no member of the series. |
| is given as absolutely conditioned, and thus a higher member is possible, and an inquiry with regard to it is necessary. |
| In the one case it is necessary to find other members of the series, in the other it is necessary to inquire for others, inasmuch as experience presents no absolute limitation of the regress. |
| For, either you do not possess a perception which absolutely limits your empirical regress, and in this case the regress cannot be regarded as complete; or, you do possess such a limitative perception, in which case it is not a part of your series (for that which limits must be distinct from that which is limited by it), and it is incumbent you to continue your regress up to this condition, and so on. |
| These remarks will be placed in their proper light by their application in the following section. |
| SECTION IX. |
| Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason with regard to the Cosmological Ideas. |
| We have shown that no transcendental use can be made either of the conceptions of reason or of understanding. |
| We have shown, likewise, that the demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in the world of sense arises from a transcendental employment of reason, resting on the opinion that phenomena are to be regarded as things in themselves. |
| It follows that we are not required to answer the question respecting the absolute quantity of a series--whether it is in itself limited or unlimited. |
| We are only called upon to determine how far we must proceed in the empirical regress from condition to condition, in order to discover, in conformity with the rule of reason, a full and correct answer to the questions proposed by reason itself. |
| This principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the extension of a possible experience--its invalidity as a principle constitutive of phenomena in themselves having been sufficiently demonstrated. |
| And thus, too, the antinomial conflict of reason with itself is completely put an end to; inasmuch as we have not only presented a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the opposite statements of reason, but have shown the true meaning of the ideas which gave rise to these statements. |
| The dialectical principle of reason has, therefore, been changed into a doctrinal principle. |
| But in fact, if this principle, in the subjective signification which we have shown to be its only true sense, may be guaranteed as a principle of the unceasing extension of the employment of our understanding, its influence and value are just as great as if it were an axiom for the a priori determination of objects. |
| For such an axiom could not exert a stronger influence on the extension and rectification of our knowledge, otherwise than by procuring for the principles of the understanding the most widely expanded employment in the field of experience. |
| I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe. |