| For this conception demands that something, A, should be of such a nature that something else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and according to an absolutely universal law. |
| We may certainly collect from phenomena a law, according to which this or that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not to be found in it. |
| Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis; for it is no mere mechanical synthesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one; that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the cause, but as posited by and through the cause, and resulting from it. |
| The strict universality of this law never can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through induction only a comparative universality, that is, an extended range of practical application. |
| But the pure conceptions of the understanding would entirely lose all their peculiar character, if we treated them merely as the productions of experience. |
| SS 10. Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. |
| There are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation and its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other, and, as it were, meet together. |
| Either the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible. |
| In the former case, the relation between them is only empirical, and an a priori representation is impossible. |
| And this is the case with phenomena, as regards that in them which is referable to mere sensation. |
| In the latter case--although representation alone (for of its causality, by means of the will, we do not here speak) does not produce the object as to its existence, it must nevertheless be a priori determinative in regard to the object, if it is only by means of the representation that we can cognize anything as an object. |
| Now there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects; firstly, intuition, by means of which the object, though only as phenomenon, is given; secondly, conception, by means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. |
| But it is evident from what has been said on aesthetic that the first condition, under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, a priori in the mind. |
| With this formal condition of sensibility, therefore, all phenomena necessarily correspond, because it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all; that is, can be empirically intuited and given. |
| Now the question is whether there do not exist, a priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding also, as conditions under which alone something, if not intuited, is yet thought as object. |
| If this question be answered in the affirmative, it follows that all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions, since, if they are not presupposed, it is impossible that anything can be an object of experience. |
| Now all experience contains, besides the intuition of the senses through which an object is given, a conception also of an object that is given in intuition. |
| Accordingly, conceptions of objects in general must lie as a priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition; and consequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as regards the form of thought) is possible only by their means. |
| For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only through them can an object of experience be thought. |
| The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a priori conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori conditions of the possibility of all experience. |
| Conceptions which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience are for that very reason necessary. |