| The proposition is that the object of the internal sense, the thinking Ego, is an absolute simple substance. |
| Without at present entering upon this subject--as it has been considered at length in a former chapter- I shall merely remark that, if something is cogitated merely as an object, without the addition of any synthetical determination of its intuition--as happens in the case of the bare representation, I--it is certain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in such a representation. |
| As, moreover, the predicates whereby I cogitate this object are merely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot be discovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold whose parts are external to each other, and, consequently, nothing to prove the existence of real composition. |
| Consciousness, therefore, is so constituted that, inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the same time its own object, it cannot divide itself--although it can divide its inhering determinations. |
| For every object in relation to itself is absolute unity. |
| Nevertheless, if the subject is regarded externally, as an object of intuition, it must, in its character of phenomenon, possess the property of composition. |
| And it must always be regarded in this manner, if we wish to know whether there is or is not contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each other. |
| THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. |
| THESIS. |
| Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world. |
| A causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena. |
| PROOF. |
| Let it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than that according to the laws of nature. |
| Consequently, everything that happens presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with absolute certainty, in conformity with a rule. |
| But this previous condition must itself be something that has happened (that has arisen in time, as it did not exist before), for, if it has always been in existence, its consequence or effect would not thus originate for the first time, but would likewise have always existed. |
| The causality, therefore, of a cause, whereby something happens, is itself a thing that has happened. |
| Now this again presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a previous condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the former, and so on. |
| If, then, everything happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of things, but only a subaltern or comparative beginning. |
| There cannot, therefore, be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which originate the one from the other. |
| But the law of nature is that nothing can happen without a sufficient a priori determined cause. |
| The proposition therefore--if all causality is possible only in accordance with the laws of nature--is, when stated in this unlimited and general manner, self-contradictory. |