| This is the great utility of the sceptical mode of treating the questions addressed by pure reason to itself. |
| By this method we easily rid ourselves of the confusions of dogmatism, and establish in its place a temperate criticism, which, as a genuine cathartic, will successfully remove the presumptuous notions of philosophy and their consequence--the vain pretension to universal science. |
| If, then, I could understand the nature of a cosmological idea and perceive, before I entered on the discussion of the subject at all, that, whatever side of the question regarding the unconditioned of the regressive synthesis of phenomena it favoured--it must either be too great or too small for every conception of the understanding--I would be able to comprehend how the idea, which relates to an object of experience--an experience which must be adequate to and in accordance with a possible conception of the understanding--must be completely void and without significance, inasmuch as its object is inadequate, consider it as we may. |
| And this is actually the case with all cosmological conceptions, which, for the reason above mentioned, involve reason, so long as it remains attached to them, in an unavoidable antinomy. |
| For suppose: |
| First, that the world has no beginning--in this case it is too large for our conception; for this conception, which consists in a successive regress, cannot overtake the whole eternity that has elapsed. |
| Grant that it has a beginning, it is then too small for the conception of the understanding. |
| For, as a beginning presupposes a time preceding, it cannot be unconditioned; and the law of the empirical employment of the understanding imposes the necessity of looking for a higher condition of time; and the world is, therefore, evidently too small for this law. |
| The same is the case with the double answer to the question regarding the extent, in space, of the world. |
| For, if it is infinite and unlimited, it must be too large for every possible empirical conception. |
| If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask; "What determines these limits?" Void space is not a self-subsistent correlate of things, and cannot be a final condition--and still less an empirical condition, forming a part of a possible experience. |
| For how can we have any experience or perception of an absolute void? |
| But the absolute totality of the empirical synthesis requires that the unconditioned be an empirical conception. |
| Consequently, a finite world is too small for our conception. |
| Secondly, if every phenomenon (matter) in space consists of an infinite number of parts, the regress of the division is always too great for our conception; and if the division of space must cease with some member of the division (the simple), it is too small for the idea of the unconditioned. |
| For the member at which we have discontinued our division still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the object. |
| Thirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance with the laws of nature; the causality of a cause must itself be an event and necessitates a regress to a still higher cause, and consequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions a parte priorI. Operative nature is therefore too large for every conception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events. |
| If we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, that is, of free agency, we are driven, in our search for sufficient reasons, on an unavoidable law of nature and are compelled to appeal to the empirical law of causality, and we find that any such totality of connection in our synthesis is too small for our necessary empirical conception. |
| Fourthly, if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary being--whether it be the world or something in the world, or the cause of the world--we must place it in a time at an infinite distance from any given moment; for, otherwise, it must be dependent on some other and higher existence. |
| Such an existence is, in this case, too large for our empirical conception, and unattainable by the continued regress of any synthesis. |
| But if we believe that everything in the world--be it condition or conditioned--is contingent; every given existence is too small for our conception. |