| It does not begin from conceptions, but from common experience, and requires a basis in actual existence. |
| But this basis is insecure, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary. |
| And this foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and above it empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room for a why or a wherefore, if it be not, in one word, infinite in its reality. |
| If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it may be, we must also admit that there is something which exists necessarily. |
| For what is contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing, which is its cause; and from this we must go on to conclude the existence of a cause which is not contingent, and which consequently exists necessarily and unconditionally. |
| Such is the argument by which reason justifies its advances towards a primal being. |
| Now reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of absolute necessity, not for the purpose of inferring a priori, from the conception of such a being, its objective existence (for if reason allowed itself to take this course, it would not require a basis in given and actual existence, but merely the support of pure conceptions), but for the purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of possible things, that conception which possesses no element inconsistent with the idea of absolute necessity. |
| For that there must be some absolutely necessary existence, it regards as a truth already established. |
| Now, if it can remove every existence incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute necessity, excepting one--this must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity is comprehensible by us, that is, deducible from the conception of it alone, or not. |
| Now that, the conception of which contains a therefore to every wherefore, which is not defective in any respect whatever, which is all-sufficient as a condition, seems to be the being of which we can justly predicate absolute necessity--for this reason, that, possessing the conditions of all that is possible, it does not and cannot itself require any condition. |
| And thus it satisfies, in one respect at least, the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. |
| In this view, it is superior to all other conceptions, which, as deficient and incomplete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all higher conditions. |
| It is true that we cannot infer from this that what does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition--the condition of all other things--must possess only a conditioned existence; but as little can we assert the contrary, for this supposed being does not possess the only characteristic which can enable reason to cognize by means of an a priori conception the unconditioned and necessary nature of its existence. |
| The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary being. |
| The former conception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter; but we have no choice, we are obliged to adhere to it, for we find that we cannot do without the existence of a necessary being; and even although we admit it, we find it out of our power to discover in the whole sphere of possibility any being that can advance wellgrounded claims to such a distinction. |
| The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. |
| It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. |
| In this being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence. |
| It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things--in other words, in that which contains all reality. |
| But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary. |
| This conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory, if we admit the existence of a necessary being, and consider that there exists a necessity for a definite and final answer to these questions. |