| Every thing, it is said, must have a cause; for if any thing wanted a cause, it would produce ITSELF; that is, exist before it existed; which is impossible. |
| But this reasoning is plainly unconclusive; because it supposes, that in our denial of a cause we still grant what we expressly deny, viz. |
| that there must be a cause; which therefore is taken to be the object itself; and that, no doubt, is an evident contradiction. |
| But to say that any thing is produced, of to express myself more properly, comes into existence, without a cause, is not to affirm, that it is itself its own cause; but on the contrary in excluding all external causes, excludes a fortiori the thing itself, which is created. |
| An object, that exists absolutely without any cause, certainly is not its own cause; and when you assert, that the one follows from the other, you suppose the very point in questions and take it for granted, that it is utterly impossible any thing can ever begin to exist without a cause, but that, upon the exclusion of one productive principle, we must still have recourse to another. |
| It is exactly the same case with the third argument[Mr. Locke.], which has been employed to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. |
| Whatever is produced without any cause, is produced by nothing; or in other words, has nothing for its cause. |
| But nothing can never be a cause, no more than it can be something, or equal to two right angles. |
| By the same intuition, that we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right angles, or not to be something, we perceive, that it can never be a cause; and consequently must perceive, that every object has a real cause of its existence. |
| I believe it will not be necessary to employ many words in shewing the weakness of this argument, after what I have said of the foregoing. |
| They are all of them founded on the same fallacy, and are derived from the same turn of thought. |
| It is sufficient only to observe, that when we exclude all causes we really do exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the existence; and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that exclusion. |
| If every thing must have a cause, it follows, that upon the exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself or of nothing as causes. |
| But it is the very point in question, whether every thing must have a cause or not; and therefore, according to all just reasoning, it ought never to be taken for granted. |
| They are still more frivolous, who say, that every effect must have a, cause, because it is implyed in the very idea of effect. |
| Every effect necessarily pre-supposes a cause; effect being a relative term, of which cause is the correlative. |
| But this does not prove, that every being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because every husband must have a wife, that therefore every man must be marryed. |
| The true state of the question is, whether every object, which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause: and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain, and hope to have proved it sufficiently by the foregoing arguments. |
| Since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning, that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every new production, that opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience. |
| The next question, then, should naturally be, how experience gives rise to such a principle? But as I find it will be more convenient to sink this question in the following, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular erects, and why we form an inference from one to another? we shall make that the subject of our future enquiry. |
| It will, perhaps, be found in the end, that the same answer will serve for both questions. |