| It is impossible, therefore, we cou'd ever will a new obligation; and consequently it is impossible the will cou'd ever accompany a promise, or produce a new obligation of morality.] |
| But, secondly, if there was any act of the mind belonging to it, it could not naturally produce any obligation. |
| This appears evidently from the foregoing reasoning. |
| A promise creates a new obligation. |
| A new obligation supposes new sentiments to arise. |
| The will never creates new sentiments. |
| There could not naturally, therefore, arise any obligation from a promise, even supposing the mind could fall into the absurdity of willing that obligation. |
| The same truth may be proved still more evidently by that reasoning, which proved justice in general to be an artificial virtue. |
| No action can be required of us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing the action. |
| This motive cannot be the sense of duty. |
| A sense of duty supposes an antecedent obligation: And where an action is not required by any natural passion, it cannot be required by any natural obligation; since it may be omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper, and consequently without any vice. |
| Now it is evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. |
| If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we never should feel any inclination to observe them. |
| This is not the case with the natural virtues. |
| Though there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity would lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of humanity. |
| A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children: But he has also a natural inclination to it. |
| And if no human creature had that indination, no one coued lie under any such obligation. |
| But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises, distinct from a sense of their obligation; it follows, that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that promises have no force, antecedent to human conventions, |
| If any one dissent from this, he must give a regular proof of these two propositions, viz. |
| THAT THERE IS A PECULIAR ACT OF THE MIND, ANNEXT TO PROMISES; AND THAT CONSEQUENT TO THIS ACT OF THE MIND, THERE ARISES AN INCLINATION TO PERFORM, DISTINCT FROM A SENSE OF DUTY. |
| I presume, that it is impossible to prove either of these two points; and therefore I venture to conclude that promises are human inventions, founded on the necessities and interests of society. |