| 2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativum). |
| 3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. |
| These are certainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited (ens imaginarium). |
| 4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing, because the conception is nothing--is impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum). |
| The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the corresponding division of the conception of something does not require special description) must therefore be arranged as follows: |
| NOTHING AS |
| 1 As Empty Conception without object, ens rationis 2 3 Empty object of Empty intuition a conception, without object, nihil privativum ens imaginarium 4 Empty object without conception, nihil negativum |
| We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction- though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates itself. |
| Both, however, are empty conceptions. |
| On the other hand, the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. |
| If light be not given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness, and if extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space. |
| Neither the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, without something real, be an object. |
| TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. |
| SECOND DIVISION. |
| TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. |
| INTRODUCTION. |
| I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance. |
| We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. |
| This does not signify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth, only cognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. |
| Hence it must not be separated from the analytical part of logic. |
| Still less must phenomenon and appearance be held to be identical. |