| A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject. |
| Therefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance. |
| In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and in every relation, consequently as it may be given in intuition. |
| But in the minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards itself as subject, relatively to thought and the unity of consciousness, but not in relation to intuition, by which it is presented as an object to thought. |
| Thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a Sophisma figurae dictionis.* |
| [*Footnote; Thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different senses. |
| In the major it is considered as relating and applying to objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. |
| In the minor, we understand it as relating merely to self-consciousness. |
| In this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought. |
| In the former premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subjects. |
| In the second, we do not speak of things, but of thought (all objects being abstracted), in which the Ego is always the subject of consciousness. |
| Hence the conclusion cannot be, "I cannot exist otherwise than as subject"; but only "I can, in cogitating my existence, employ my Ego only as the subject of the judgement." But this is an identical proposition, and throws no light on the mode of my existence.] |
| That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be plain to any one who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition of the principles of the pure understanding, and the section on noumena. |
| For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which can exist per se--only as a subject and never as a predicate, possesses no objective reality; that is to say, we can never know whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception; consequently, the conception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we derive no proper knowledge. |
| If this conception is to indicate by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition, we must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition of its objective reality. |
| For through intuition alone can an object be given. |
| But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my thought. |
| If then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application of the conception of substance--that is, of a subject existing per se--to the subject as a thinking being. |
| And thus the conception of the simple nature of substance, which is connected with the objective reality of this conception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought; whilst we remain perfectly ignorant whether the subject is composite or not. |
| Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Substantiality or Permanence of the Soul. |
| This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common argument which attempts to prove that the soul--it being granted that it is a simple being--cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition; he saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction, or disappearance. |