| For the world is not given in its totality in any intuition; consequently, its quantity cannot be given prior to the regress. |
| It follows that we are unable to make any declaration respecting the cosmical quantity in itself--not even that the regress in it is a regress in infinitum; we must only endeavour to attain to a conception of the quantity of the universe, in conformity with the rule which determines the empirical regress in it. |
| But this rule merely requires us never to admit an absolute limit to our series--how far soever we may have proceeded in it, but always, on the contrary, to subordinate every phenomenon to some other as its condition, and consequently to proceed to this higher phenomenon. |
| Such a regress is, therefore, the regressus in indefinitum, which, as not determining a quantity in the object, is clearly distinguishable from the regressus in infinitum. |
| [*Footnote; The cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller than the possible empirical regress, upon which its conception is based. |
| And as this regress cannot be a determinate infinite regress, still less a determinate finite (absolutely limited), it is evident that we cannot regard the world as either finite or infinite, because the regress, which gives us the representation of the world, is neither finite nor infinite.] |
| It follows from what we have said that we are not justified in declaring the world to be infinite in space, or as regards past time. |
| For this conception of an infinite given quantity is empirical; but we cannot apply the conception of an infinite quantity to the world as an object of the senses. |
| I cannot say, "The regress from a given perception to everything limited either in space or time, proceeds in infinitum," for this presupposes an infinite cosmical quantity; neither can I say, "It is finite," for an absolute limit is likewise impossible in experience. |
| It follows that I am not entitled to make any assertion at all respecting the whole object of experience--the world of sense; I must limit my declarations to the rule according to which experience or empirical knowledge is to be attained. |
| To the question, therefore, respecting the cosmical quantity, the first and negative answer is; "The world has no beginning in time, and no absolute limit in space." |
| For, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void time on the one hand, and by a void space on the other. |
| Now, since the world, as a phenomenon, cannot be thus limited in itself for a phenomenon is not a thing in itself; it must be possible for us to have a perception of this limitation by a void time and a void space. |
| But such a perception--such an experience is impossible; because it has no content. |
| Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is empirically, and therefore absolutely, impossible.* |
| [*Footnote; The reader will remark that the proof presented above is very different from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of the first antinomy. |
| In that demonstration, it was taken for granted that the world is a thing in itself--given in its totality prior to all regress, and a determined position in space and time was denied to it--if it was not considered as occupying all time and all space. |
| Hence our conclusion differed from that given above; for we inferred in the antithesis the actual infinity of the world.] |
| From this follows the affirmative answer; "The regress in the series of phenomena--as a determination of the cosmical quantity, proceeds in indefinitum." This is equivalent to saying; "The world of sense has no absolute quantity, but the empirical regress (through which alone the world of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions) rests upon a rule, which requires it to proceed from every member of the series, as conditioned, to one still more remote (whether through personal experience, or by means of history, or the chain of cause and effect), and not to cease at any point in this extension of the possible empirical employment of the understanding." And this is the proper and only use which reason can make of its principles. |
| The above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of phenomena. |
| It does not, for example, forbid us, in our ascent from an individual human being through the line of his ancestors, to expect that we shall discover at some point of the regress a primeval pair, or to admit, in the series of heavenly bodies, a sun at the farthest possible distance from some centre. |