| Nor is this observable only with regard to characters and manners, but may be remarked even in the most minute circumstances. |
| A violent cough in another gives us uneasiness; though in itself it does not in the least affect us. |
| A man will be mortified, if you tell him he has a stinking breath; though it is evidently no annoyance to himself. |
| Our fancy easily changes its situation; and either surveying ourselves as we appear to others, or considering others as they feel themselves, we enter, by that means, into sentiments, which no way belong to us, and in which nothing but sympathy is able to interest us. |
| And this sympathy we sometimes carry so far, as even to be displeased with a quality commodious to us, merely because it displeases others, and makes us disagreeable in their eyes; though perhaps we never can have any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to them. |
| There have been many systems of morality advanced by philosophers in all ages; but if they are strictly examined, they may be reduced to two, which alone merit our attention. |
| Moral good and evil are certainly distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason: But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particular persons. |
| My opinion is, that both these causes are intermixed in our judgments of morals; after the same manner as they are in our decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty: Though I am also of opinion, that reflections on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great lines of our duty. |
| There are, however, instances, in cases of less moment, wherein this immediate taste or sentiment produces our approbation. |
| Wit, and a certain easy and disengaged behaviour, are qualities immediately agreeable to others, and command their love and esteem. |
| Some of these qualities produce satisfaction in others by particular original principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for: Others may be resolved into principles, which are more general. |
| This will best appear upon a particular enquiry. |
| As some qualities acquire their merit from their being immediately agreeable to others, without any tendency to public interest; so some are denominated virtuous from their being immediately agreeable to the person himself, who possesses them. |
| Each of the passions and operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or disagreeable. |
| The first is virtuous, the second vicious. |
| This particular feeling constitutes the very nature of the passion; and therefore needs not be accounted for. |
| But however directly the distinction of vice and virtue may seem to flow from the immediate pleasure or uneasiness, which particular qualities cause to ourselves or others; it is easy to observe, that it has also a considerable dependence on the principle of sympathy so often insisted on. |
| We approve of a person, who is possessed of qualities immediately agreeable to those, with whom he has any commerce; though perhaps we ourselves never reaped any pleasure from them. |
| We also approve of one, who is possessed of qualities, that are immediately agreeable to himself; though they be of no service to any mortal. |
| To account for this we must have recourse to the foregoing principles. |
| Thus, to take a general review of the present hypothesis: Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which produces pain, is called vicious. |