| All this absurdity proceeds from our endeavouring to bestow a place on what is utterly incapable of it; and that endeavour again arises from our inclination to compleat an union, which is founded on causation, and a contiguity of time, by attributing to the objects a conjunction in place. |
| But if ever reason be of sufficient force to overcome prejudice, it is certain, that in the present case it must prevail. |
| For we have only this choice left, either to suppose that some beings exist without any place; or that they are figured and extended; or that when they are incorporated with extended objects, the whole is in the whole, and the whole in every part. |
| The absurdity of the two last suppositions proves sufficiently the veracity of the first. |
| Nor is there any fourth opinion. |
| For as to the supposition of their existence in the manner of mathematical points, it resolves itself into the second opinion, and supposes, that several passions may be placed in a circular figure, and that a certain number of smells, conjoined with a certain number of sounds, may make a body of twelve cubic inches; which appears ridiculous upon the bare mentioning of it. |
| But though in this view of things we cannot refuse to condemn the materialists, who conjoin all thought with extension; yet a little reflection will show us equal reason for blaming their antagonists, who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance. |
| The most vulgar philosophy informs us, that no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately, and without the interposition of an image or perception. |
| That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. |
| Now the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. |
| The perception consists of parts. |
| These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness. |
| The termination of these three dimensions is what we call figure. |
| This figure is moveable, separable, and divisible. |
| Mobility, and separability are the distinguishing properties of extended objects. |
| And to cut short all disputes, the very idea of extension is copyed from nothing but an impression, and consequently must perfectly agree to it. |
| To say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended. |
| The free-thinker may now triumph in his turn; and having found there are impressions and ideas really extended, may ask his antagonists, how they can incorporate a simple and indivisible subject with an extended perception? All the arguments of Theologians may here be retorted upon them. |
| Is the indivisible subject, or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? Is it in this particular part, or in that other? Is it in every part without being extended? Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? It is impossible to give any answer to these questions, but what will both be absurd in itself, and will account for the union of our indivisible perceptions with an extended substance. |
| This gives me an occasion to take a-new into consideration the question concerning the substance of the soul; and though I have condemned that question as utterly unintelligible, yet I cannot forbear proposing some farther reflections concerning it. |
| I assert, that the doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism, and will serve to justify all those sentiments, for which Spinoza is so universally infamous. |