| We shall be removed from all our friends and acquaintance, and our poverty and meanness will by that means sit more easy upon us. |
| In examining these sentiments, I find they afford many very convincing arguments for my present purpose. |
| First, We may infer from them, that the uneasiness of being contemned depends on sympathy, and that sympathy depends on the relation of objects to ourselves; since we are most uneasy under the contempt of persons, who are both related to us by blood, and contiguous in place. |
| Hence we-seek to diminish this sympathy and uneasiness by separating these relations, and placing ourselves in a contiguity to strangers, and at a distance from relations. |
| Secondly, We may conclude, that relations are requisite to sympathy, not absolutely considered as relations, but by their influence in converting our ideas of the sentiments of others into the very sentiments, by means of the association betwixt the idea of their persons, and that of our own. |
| For here the relations of kindred and contiguity both subsist; but not being united in the same persons, they contribute in a less degree to the sympathy. |
| Thirdly, This very circumstance of the diminution of sympathy by the separation of relations is worthy of our attention. |
| Suppose I am placed in a poor condition among strangers, and consequently am but lightly treated; I yet find myself easier in that situation, than when I was every day exposed to the contempt of my kindred and countrymen. |
| Here I feel a double contempt; from my relations, but they are absent; from those about me, but they are strangers. |
| This double contempt is likewise strengthened by the two relations of kindred and contiguity. |
| But as the persons are not the same, who are connected with me by those two relations, this difference of ideas separates the impressions arising from the contempt, and keeps them from running into each other. |
| The contempt of my neighbours has a certain influence; as has also that of my kindred: But these influences are distinct, and never unite; as when the contempt proceeds from persons who are at once both my neighbours and kindred. |
| This phaenomenon is analogous to the system of pride and humility above-explained, which may seem so extraordinary to vulgar apprehensions. |
| Fourthly, A person in these circumstances naturally conceals his birth from those among whom he lives, and is very uneasy, if any one suspects him to be of a family, much superior to his present fortune and way of living. |
| Every thing in this world is judged of by comparison. |
| What is an immense fortune for a private gentleman is beggary for a prince. |
| A peasant would think himself happy in what cannot afford necessaries for a gentleman. |
| When a man has either been acustomed to a more splendid way of living, or thinks himself intitled to it by his birth and quality, every thing below is disagreeable and even shameful; and it is with she greatest industry he conceals his pretensions to a better fortune. |
| Here he himself knows his misfortunes; but as those, with whom he lives. |
| are ignorant of them, he has the disagreeable reflection and comparison suggested only by his own thoughts, and never receives it by a sympathy with others; which must contribute very much so his ease and satisfaction. |
| If there be any objections to this hypothesis, THAT THE PLEASURE, WHICH WE RECEIVE FROM PRAISE, ARISES FROM A COMMUNICATION OF SENTIMENTS, we shall find, uponexamination, that these objections, when taken in a properlight, will serve to confirm it. |