| But however ingenious this reason may seem, it plainly depends upon the fancy, which by the possibility of such a reduction, finds a closer connexion and relation betwixt a cup and the proprietor of its metal, than betwixt a ship and the proprietor of its wood, where the substance is more fixed and unalterable.] |
| The right of succession is a very natural one, from the presumed consent of the parent or near relation, and from the general interest of mankind, which requires, that men's possessions should pass to those, who are dearest to them, in order to render them more industrious and frugal. |
| Perhaps these causes are seconded by the influence of relation, or the association of ideas, by which we are naturally directed to consider the son after the parent's decease, and ascribe to him a title to his father's possessions. |
| Those goods must become the property of some body: But of whom is the question. |
| Here it is evident the persons children naturally present themselves to the mind; and being already. |
| connected to those possessions by means of their deceased parent, we are apt to connect them still farther by the relation of property. |
| Of this there are many parallel instances. |
| [Footnote 20 In examining the different titles to authority in government, we shall meet with many reasons to convince us, that the right of succession depends, in a great measure on the imagination. |
| Mean while I shall rest contented with observing one example, which belongs to the present subject. |
| Suppose that a person die without children, and that a dispute arises among his relations concerning his inheritance; it is evident, that if his riches be deriv'd partly from his father, partly from his mother, the most natural way of determining such a dispute, is, to divide his possessions, and assign each part to the family, from whence it is deriv'd. |
| Now as the person is suppos'd to have been once the full and entire proprietor of those goods; I ask, what is it makes us find a certain equity and natural reason in this partition, except it be the imagination? His affection to these families does not depend upon his possessions; for which reason his consent can never be presum'd precisely for such a partition. |
| And as to the public interest, it seems not to be in the least concern'd on the one side or the other.] |
| SECT. IV OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BY CONSENT |
| However useful, or even necessary, the stability of possession may be to human society, it is attended with very considerable inconveniences. |
| The relation of fitness or suitableness ought never to enter into consideration, in distributing the properties of mankind; but we must govern ourselves by rules, which are more general in their application, and more free from doubt and uncertainty. |
| Of this kind is present possession upon the first establishment of society; and afterwards occupation, prescription, accession, and succession. |
| As these depend very much on chance, they must frequently prove contradictory both to men's wants and desires; and persons and possessions must often be very ill adjusted. |
| This is a grand inconvenience, which calls for a remedy. |
| To apply one directly, and allow every man to seize by violence what he judges to be fit for him, would destroy society; and therefore the rules of justice seek some medium betwixt a rigid stability, and this changeable and uncertain adjustment. |
| But there is no medium better than that obvious one, that possession and property should always be stable, except when the proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person. |
| This rule can have no ill consequence, in occasioning wars and dissentions; since the proprietor's consent, who alone is concerned, is taken along in the alienation: And it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting property to persons. |