| Those goods must become the property of some body: But of whom is the question. |
| Here it is evident the persons children naturally present themselves to the mind; and being already. |
| connected to those possessions by means of their deceased parent, we are apt to connect them still farther by the relation of property. |
| Of this there are many parallel instances. |
| [Footnote 20 In examining the different titles to authority in government, we shall meet with many reasons to convince us, that the right of succession depends, in a great measure on the imagination. |
| Mean while I shall rest contented with observing one example, which belongs to the present subject. |
| Suppose that a person die without children, and that a dispute arises among his relations concerning his inheritance; it is evident, that if his riches be deriv'd partly from his father, partly from his mother, the most natural way of determining such a dispute, is, to divide his possessions, and assign each part to the family, from whence it is deriv'd. |
| Now as the person is suppos'd to have been once the full and entire proprietor of those goods; I ask, what is it makes us find a certain equity and natural reason in this partition, except it be the imagination? His affection to these families does not depend upon his possessions; for which reason his consent can never be presum'd precisely for such a partition. |
| And as to the public interest, it seems not to be in the least concern'd on the one side or the other.] |
| SECT. IV OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BY CONSENT |
| However useful, or even necessary, the stability of possession may be to human society, it is attended with very considerable inconveniences. |
| The relation of fitness or suitableness ought never to enter into consideration, in distributing the properties of mankind; but we must govern ourselves by rules, which are more general in their application, and more free from doubt and uncertainty. |
| Of this kind is present possession upon the first establishment of society; and afterwards occupation, prescription, accession, and succession. |
| As these depend very much on chance, they must frequently prove contradictory both to men's wants and desires; and persons and possessions must often be very ill adjusted. |
| This is a grand inconvenience, which calls for a remedy. |
| To apply one directly, and allow every man to seize by violence what he judges to be fit for him, would destroy society; and therefore the rules of justice seek some medium betwixt a rigid stability, and this changeable and uncertain adjustment. |
| But there is no medium better than that obvious one, that possession and property should always be stable, except when the proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person. |
| This rule can have no ill consequence, in occasioning wars and dissentions; since the proprietor's consent, who alone is concerned, is taken along in the alienation: And it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting property to persons. |
| Different parts of the earth produce different commodities; and not only so, but different men both are by nature fitted for different employments, and attain to greater perfection in any one, when they confine themselves to it alone. |
| All this requires a mutual exchange and commerce; for which reason the translation of property by consent is founded on a law of nature, as well as its stability without such a consent. |
| So far is determined by a plain utility and interest. |