| If, upon impartial enquiry, the same conclusion, that I have formed, be assented to by philosophers, the next business is to examine the analogy, which there is betwixt belief, and other acts of the mind, and find the cause of the firmness and strength of conception: And this I do not esteem a difficult task. |
| The transition from a present impression, always enlivens and strengthens any idea. |
| When any object is presented, the idea of its usual attendant immediately strikes us, as something real and solid. |
| It is felt, rather than conceived, and approaches the impression, from which it is derived, in its force and influence. |
| This I have proved at large. |
| I cannot add any new arguments. |
| I had entertained some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. |
| But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. |
| If this be not a good general reason for scepticism, it is at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supplied) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. |
| I shall propose the arguments on both sides, beginning with those that induced me to deny the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being. |
| When we talk of self or substance, we must have an idea annexed to these terms, otherwise they are altogether unintelligible. |
| Every idea is derived from preceding impressions; and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. |
| We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense. |
| Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. |
| All perceptions are distinct. |
| They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceived as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity. |
| When I view this table and that chimney, nothing is present to me but particular perceptions, which are of a like nature with all the other perceptions. |
| This is the doctrine of philosophers. |
| But this table, which is present to me, and the chimney, may and do exist separately. |
| This is the doctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. |
| There is no contradiction, therefore, in extending the same doctrine to all the perceptions. |