| For, as a beginning presupposes a time preceding, it cannot be unconditioned; and the law of the empirical employment of the understanding imposes the necessity of looking for a higher condition of time; and the world is, therefore, evidently too small for this law. |
| The same is the case with the double answer to the question regarding the extent, in space, of the world. |
| For, if it is infinite and unlimited, it must be too large for every possible empirical conception. |
| If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask; "What determines these limits?" Void space is not a self-subsistent correlate of things, and cannot be a final condition--and still less an empirical condition, forming a part of a possible experience. |
| For how can we have any experience or perception of an absolute void? |
| But the absolute totality of the empirical synthesis requires that the unconditioned be an empirical conception. |
| Consequently, a finite world is too small for our conception. |
| Secondly, if every phenomenon (matter) in space consists of an infinite number of parts, the regress of the division is always too great for our conception; and if the division of space must cease with some member of the division (the simple), it is too small for the idea of the unconditioned. |
| For the member at which we have discontinued our division still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the object. |
| Thirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance with the laws of nature; the causality of a cause must itself be an event and necessitates a regress to a still higher cause, and consequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions a parte priorI. Operative nature is therefore too large for every conception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events. |
| If we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, that is, of free agency, we are driven, in our search for sufficient reasons, on an unavoidable law of nature and are compelled to appeal to the empirical law of causality, and we find that any such totality of connection in our synthesis is too small for our necessary empirical conception. |
| Fourthly, if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary being--whether it be the world or something in the world, or the cause of the world--we must place it in a time at an infinite distance from any given moment; for, otherwise, it must be dependent on some other and higher existence. |
| Such an existence is, in this case, too large for our empirical conception, and unattainable by the continued regress of any synthesis. |
| But if we believe that everything in the world--be it condition or conditioned--is contingent; every given existence is too small for our conception. |
| For in this case we are compelled to seek for some other existence upon which the former depends. |
| We have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either too great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis, and consequently for every possible conception of the understanding. |
| Why did we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this and, instead of accusing the cosmological idea of over stepping or of falling short of its true aim, possible experience, say that, in the first case, the empirical conception is always too small for the idea, and in the second too great, and thus attach the blame of these contradictions to the empirical regress? |
| The reason is this. |
| Possible experience can alone give reality to our conceptions; without it a conception is merely an idea, without truth or relation to an object. |
| Hence a possible empirical conception must be the standard by which we are to judge whether an idea is anything more than an idea and fiction of thought, or whether it relates to an object in the world. |
| If we say of a thing that in relation to some other thing it is too large or too small, the former is considered as existing for the sake of the latter, and requiring to be adapted to it. |