| In this sense, philosophy is merely the idea of a possible science, which does not exist in concreto, but to which we endeavour in various ways to approximate, until we have discovered the right path to pursue--a path overgrown by the errors and illusions of sense--and the image we have hitherto tried in vain to shape has become a perfect copy of the great prototype. |
| Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy--it does not exist; if it does, where is it, who possesses it, and how shall we know it? |
| We can only learn to philosophize; in other words, we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at the same time, the right of investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and even of rejecting them. |
| Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic conception--a conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we are trying to elaborate into a science; all that we at present know being the systematic unity of this cognition, and consequently the logical completeness of the cognition for the desired end. |
| But there is also a cosmical conception (conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy, which has always formed the true basis of this term, especially when philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philosopher. |
| In this view philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not merely an artist--who occupies himself with conceptions--but a lawgiver, legislating for human reason. |
| In this sense of the word, it would be in the highest degree arrogant to assume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea alone. |
| The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician--how far soever the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter in philosophical knowledge--are merely artists, engaged in the arrangement and formation of conceptions; they cannot be termed philosophers. |
| Above them all, there is the ideal teacher, who employs them as instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. |
| Him alone can we call philosopher; but he nowhere exists. |
| But the idea of his legislative power resides in the mind of every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of reason. |
| This idea is, therefore, a cosmical conception.* |
| [*Footnote; By a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily take an interest; the aim of a science must accordingly be determined according to scholastic conceptions, if it is regarded merely as a means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends.] |
| In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. |
| To this all other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its attainment. |
| This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed moral philosophy. |
| The superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients always included the idea--and in an especial manner--of moralist in that of philosopher. |
| Even at the present day, we call a man who appears to have the power of self-government, even although his knowledge may be very limited, by the name of philosopher. |
| The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects- nature and freedom--and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also those of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which, finally, merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. |
| The philosophy of nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to that which ought to be. |
| But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles. |