| Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no illusion. |
| On the contrary, if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external objects, considered as things in themselves, without regarding the determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without limiting my judgement to that relation--then, and then only, arises illusion.] |
| IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object--God--which never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can never be an object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time--and intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always includes limitation. |
| But with what right can we do this if we make them forms of objects as things in themselves, and such, moreover, as would continue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence of things, even though the things themselves were annihilated? |
| For as conditions of all existence in general, space and time must be conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also. |
| But if we do not thus make them objective forms of all things, there is no other way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of intuition--external and internal; which is called sensuous, because it is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the existence of the object of the intuition (a mode of intuition which, so far as we can judge, can belong only to the Creator), but is dependent on the existence of the object, is possible, therefore, only on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is affected by the object. |
| It is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. |
| It may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this respect agree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus derivativus), and not an original (intuitus originarius), consequently not an intellectual intuition, and this intuition, as such, for reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never to a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively to given objects). |
| This latter remark, however, must be taken only as an illustration, and not as any proof of the truth of our aesthetical theory. |
| SS 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic. |
| We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the question; "How are synthetical propositions a priori possible?" That is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a judgement a priori we pass out beyond the given conception, something which is not discoverable in that conception, but is certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the conception, and can be united synthetically with it. |
| But the judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never reach farther than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for objects of possible experience. |
| SECOND PART. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. |
| INTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic. |
| I. Of Logic in General. |
| Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which is the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). |
| Through the first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the mind), thought. |
| Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition. |
| Both are either pure or empirical. |
| They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation. |
| Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. |