| It may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this respect agree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus derivativus), and not an original (intuitus originarius), consequently not an intellectual intuition, and this intuition, as such, for reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never to a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively to given objects). |
| This latter remark, however, must be taken only as an illustration, and not as any proof of the truth of our aesthetical theory. |
| SS 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic. |
| We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the question; "How are synthetical propositions a priori possible?" That is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a judgement a priori we pass out beyond the given conception, something which is not discoverable in that conception, but is certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the conception, and can be united synthetically with it. |
| But the judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never reach farther than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for objects of possible experience. |
| SECOND PART. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. |
| INTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic. |
| I. Of Logic in General. |
| Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which is the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). |
| Through the first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the mind), thought. |
| Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition. |
| Both are either pure or empirical. |
| They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation. |
| Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. |
| Pure intuition consequently contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the thought of an object. |
| Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriorI. We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. |
| Our nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. |
| On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous intuition is the understanding. |
| Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. |
| Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. |
| Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. |