| SECOND PART. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. |
| INTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic. |
| I. Of Logic in General. |
| Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which is the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). |
| Through the first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the mind), thought. |
| Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition. |
| Both are either pure or empirical. |
| They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation. |
| Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. |
| Pure intuition consequently contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the thought of an object. |
| Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriorI. We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. |
| Our nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. |
| On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous intuition is the understanding. |
| Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. |
| Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. |
| Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. |
| Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). |
| Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. |
| Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. |
| in no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. |
| But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. |