| These objects, therefore, are mediately represented by the conception of divisibility. |
| All judgements, accordingly, are functions of unity in our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions are collected into one. |
| But we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgements, so that understanding may be represented as the faculty of judging. |
| For it is, according to what has been said above, a faculty of thought. |
| Now thought is cognition by means of conceptions. |
| But conceptions, as predicates of possible judgements, relate to some representation of a yet undetermined object. |
| Thus the conception of body indicates something--for example, metal--which can be cognized by means of that conception. |
| It is therefore a conception, for the reason alone that other representations are contained under it, by means of which it can relate to objects. |
| It is therefore the predicate to a possible judgement; for example; "Every metal is a body." All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements. |
| And that this may be effected very easily, the following section will show. |
| SS 5. SECTION II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements. |
| If we abstract all the content of a judgement, and consider only the intellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a judgement can be brought under four heads, of which each contains three momenta. |
| These may be conveniently represented in the following table: |
| | 1 | Quantity of judgements | Universal | Particular | Singular | 2| Quality | Affirmative | Negative | Infinite | 3| Relation | Categorical | Hypothetical | Disjunctive | 4| Modality | Problematical | Assertorical | Apodeictical |
|
| As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential points, from the usual technique of logicians, the following observations, for the prevention of otherwise possible misunderstanding, will not be without their use. |
| 1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in syllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones. |
| For, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all, its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. |
| The predicate is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate applied. |
| On the other hand, let us compare a singular with a general judgement, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. |
| The singular judgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different. |
| Thus, if we estimate a singular judgement (judicium singulare) not merely according to its intrinsic validity as a judgement, but also as a cognition generally, according to its quantity in comparison with that of other cognitions, it is then entirely different from a general judgement (judicium commune), and in a complete table of the momenta of thought deserves a separate place--though, indeed, this would not be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use of judgements in reference to each other. |