| The consequence of this would be no less than the destruction of that succession of causes, which we observe in the world; and indeed, the utter annihilation of time. |
| For if one cause were co-temporary with its effect, and this effect with its effect, and so on, it is plain there would be no such thing as succession, and all objects must be co-existent. |
| If this argument appear satisfactory, it is well. |
| If not, I beg the reader to allow me the same liberty, which I have used in the preceding case, of supposing it such. |
| For he shall find, that the affair is of no great importance. |
| Having thus discovered or supposed the two relations of contiguity and succession to be essential to causes and effects, I find I am stopt short, and can proceed no farther in considering any single instance of cause and effect. |
| Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as the cause of motion in another. |
| When we consider these objects with utmost attention, we find only that the one body approaches the other; and that the motion of it precedes that of the other, but without any, sensible interval. |
| It is in vain to rack ourselves with farther thought and reflection upon this subject. |
| We can go no farther in considering this particular instance. |
| Should any one leave this instance, and pretend to define a cause, by saying it is something productive of another, it is evident he would say nothing. |
| For what does he mean by production? Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? If he can; I desire it may be produced. |
| If he cannot; he here runs in a circle, and gives a synonimous term instead of a definition. |
| Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? By, no means. |
| An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause. |
| There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mentioned. |
| Here again I turn the object on all sides, in order to discover the nature of this necessary connexion, and find the impression, or impressions, from which its idea may be derived. |
| When I cast my eye on the known Qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not in the least on them. |
| When I consider their relations, I can find none but those of contiguity and succession; which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory. |
| Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression? This would be too strong a proof of levity and inconstancy; since the contrary principle has been already so firmly established, as to admit of no farther doubt; at least, till we have more fully examined the present difficulty. |
| We must, therefore, proceed like those, who being in search of any thing, that lies concealed from them, and not finding it in the place they expected, beat about all the neighbouring fields, without any certain view or design, in hopes their good fortune will at last guide them to what they search for. |